causes of the cuban missile crisis essay

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What was the outcome of the Cuban missile crisis?

Should the united states maintain the embargo against cuba that was inflamed by the cuban missile crisis.

• What was the Cold War?
• How did the Cold War end?
• Why was the Cuban missile crisis such an important event in the Cold War?

Cuban missile crisis

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What was the Cuban missile crisis?

The Cuban missile crisis was a major confrontation in 1962 that brought the United States and the Soviet Union close to war over the presence of Soviet nuclear-armed ballistic missiles in Cuba.

When did the Cuban missile crisis take place?

The Cuban missile crisis took place in October 1962.

The Cuban missile crisis marked the climax of an acutely antagonistic period in U.S.-Soviet relations. It played an important part in Nikita Khrushchev ’s fall from power and the Soviet Union’s determination to achieve nuclear parity with the United States. The crisis also marked the closest point that the world had ever come to global nuclear war.

Whether the U.S. should maintain its embargo against Cuba that was inflamed by the Cuban Missile Crisis is hotly debated. Some say Cuba has not met the conditions required to lift it, and the US will look weak for lifting the sanctions. Others say the 50-year policy has failed to achieve its goals, and Cuba does not pose a threat to the United States. For more on the Cuba embargo debate, visit ProCon.org .

Cuban missile crisis , (October 1962), major confrontation that brought the United States and the Soviet Union close to war over the presence of Soviet nuclear-armed missiles in Cuba .

Having promised in May 1960 to defend Cuba with Soviet arms, the Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev assumed that the United States would take no steps to prevent the installation of Soviet medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Cuba. Such missiles could hit much of the eastern United States within a few minutes if launched from Cuba. The United States learned in July 1962 that the Soviet Union had begun missile shipments to Cuba. By August 29 new military construction and the presence of Soviet technicians had been reported by U.S. U-2 spy planes flying over the island, and on October 14 the presence of a ballistic missile on a launching site was reported.

After carefully considering the alternatives of an immediate U.S. invasion of Cuba (or air strikes of the missile sites), a blockade of the island, or further diplomatic maneuvers, U.S. Pres. John F. Kennedy decided to place a naval “quarantine,” or blockade, on Cuba to prevent further Soviet shipments of missiles. Kennedy announced the quarantine on October 22 and warned that U.S. forces would seize “offensive weapons and associated matériel” that Soviet vessels might attempt to deliver to Cuba. During the following days, Soviet ships bound for Cuba altered course away from the quarantined zone. As the two superpowers hovered close to the brink of nuclear war, messages were exchanged between Kennedy and Khrushchev amidst extreme tension on both sides. On October 28 Khrushchev capitulated , informing Kennedy that work on the missile sites would be halted and that the missiles already in Cuba would be returned to the Soviet Union. In return, Kennedy committed the United States to never invading Cuba. Kennedy also secretly promised to withdraw the nuclear-armed missiles that the United States had stationed in Turkey in previous years. In the following weeks both superpowers began fulfilling their promises, and the crisis was over by late November. Cuba’s communist leader, Fidel Castro , was infuriated by the Soviets’ retreat in the face of the U.S. ultimatum but was powerless to act.

The Cuban missile crisis marked the climax of an acutely antagonistic period in U.S.-Soviet relations. The crisis also marked the closest point that the world had ever come to global nuclear war. It is generally believed that the Soviets’ humiliation in Cuba played an important part in Khrushchev’s fall from power in October 1964 and in the Soviet Union’s determination to achieve, at the least, a nuclear parity with the United States.

The Cuban Missile Crisis: The Causes and Effects Essay

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The Causes for the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Role of Cuba

The effects of the cuban missile crisis.

The focus on nuclear weapons was the typical feature of two powerful states’ development during the period of the Cold War. The Soviet Union and the United States were ready to use the possibilities of the nuclear weapons in order to state their superiority at the global political arena. As a result, any conflict could become the reason for developing the global nuclear war.

The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 in which the Soviet Union, Cuba, and the United States were involved was the turning point of the states’ confrontation in the Cold War because of risks to develop the nuclear conflict (Carter, 2008). Although there are many opinions on the causes and effects of the Cuban missile crisis, it is possible to determine the main factors which can be discussed as influential for developing the most threatening situation in the world during the period of the Cold War.

Thus, the causes for the crisis are closely associated with the Soviet Union’s intentions to protect the state from the US blockades and Cuba from the US invasion, and the effects depend on the peaceful resolution of the conflict with improving the connections between the two powerful states.

The revolution in Cuba in 1959 made the United States discuss different methods to prevent the expansion of the Communist ideas at the territories near the US boundaries. The development of different plans to establish the anti-Communist regime in Cuba resulted in the Bay of Pigs Invasion of 1961, which was supported and realized by the US government (Pressman, 2001).

The US President John F. Kennedy controlled the realization of the operation, but it was ineffective. The attempts of the invasion were considered by the Soviet Union as threatening to the Communist regime and to the world’s peace. The reaction of the Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev to the actions of the US government was to place the Soviet nuclear missiles on Cuba according to the agreement with Fidel Castro.

After the revolution, Fidel Castro relied on the support of the most powerful Communist state that is why the Soviet Union’s intentions were shared by the Cuban leader, and the construction of the missile sites was justified from the point of defense (Schier, 2010). The actions of Khrushchev could be explained with references to the risk of anti-Communist movements in Cuba.

During the year of 1962, the intensified Cuban missile crisis increased the tension between the two powerful states ready to use the nuclear weapons in order to regulate the international conflict. The fact of the Bay of Pigs Invasion along with the results of the Berlin Crisis made the situation more complicated. In spite of the fact that the USA was against the idea of placing the missile constructions in Cuba, the Soviet Union continued to realize the idea to protect the state interests and perform the necessary security procedures.

Kennedy stated that the USA would focus on any measures to prevent the threat for the US nation’s security. However, during September of 1962, the Soviet Union realized all the necessary preparation procedures in order to construct the missile sites in Cuba (Pressman, 2001). The ignorance of Kennedy’s statement and position was also a result of the US policy in relation to constructing the missiles in Turkey which were discussed as potential risks for the Soviet Union.

The United States paid much attention to the possibilities for the Soviet Union to construct the missile sites in Cuba, but only a few indicators were noticed during September of 1962. All the controversial activities of the Soviet Union in Cuba were explained with references to the necessity to protect Cuba from the further invasions from the United States or other non-Communist countries.

The tensions between the powerful states were intensified, and there were no opportunities to assess adequately the Soviet Union’s intentions in relation to defending Cuba and attacking the United States with the help of the missiles constructed at the territories of Cuba (Schier, 2010). From this point, the Soviet Union and the United States had no intentions to develop the nuclear war, but such a risk was obvious because of Kennedy and Khrushchev’s goals to protect the states’ interest by all means.

The Development of the Crisis and John F. Kennedy’s Reaction to the Soviet Union’s Activities in Cuba

The United States suspected that the Soviet Union constructed the missile sites in Cuba, but this information was not supported with evidence and facts. On October 14, during the operations to gather the necessary evidence, the U-2 aircraft took clear photographs on which the construction of the missile sites was fixed. It was noticed that the construction was realized for medium-range ballistic missiles as well as for intermediate-range ballistic missiles.

Thus, the 13-day crisis started on October 15 when the information about the photographs was released. In a few days, the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (EXCOMM) was organized in order to develop the plan of actions directed toward resolving the conflict situation (Stein, 2008).

To react to the construction of the missile sites, the threat of the nuclear war, and the Soviet Union’s attacks, several different strategic approaches were proposed by the members of the EXCOMM. The problem was in the fact that there was no any prepared plan of actions because of the focus on the Soviet Union’s acceptance of conditions and agreements not to construct nuclear missiles at the territories near the USA.

It is possible to refer to different visions of the problem by the United States and by the Soviet Union. Thus, the Soviet Union placed the nuclear missiles in Cuba in response to placing the US missiles in Turkey and as the support for Cuba to prevent the further invading activities from the United States.

From this perspective, the first measure discussed by the EXCOMM as the absence of reaction could be discussed as rather relevant in relation to the situation, but it was risky because of impossibility to predict the Soviet Union’s future actions and analyze their real intentions (Schier, 2010).

The approach is known as ‘do nothing’ was rejected by the majority of the EXCOMM representatives. Different variants of diplomatic measures were discussed as effective means to guarantee the Soviet Union’s removal of the missiles from the territories of Cuba. Nevertheless, the necessity to develop negations could lead to the unwanted concessions for the United States.

Kennedy paid much attention to the military actions as the best approaches to make the Soviet Union realize the removal of the missiles. Thus, the accents were made on the active blockade of the missiles and invasion of Cuba. The possibility of the airstrike was discussed as the reserved variant of actions during the discussion of the problem.

However, the method of blockade was chosen as the most effective in order to prevent the Soviet Union from the further transportation of the missiles to the territories of Cuba. The blockade of the missiles’ transportation was also supported by the US government’s demand to remove the constructed missiles in Cuba. This approach was chosen because of a range of advantages.

The open blockade demonstrated the power of the United States and the readiness of the President to use the military forces. Furthermore, the method of blockade helped accentuate the US naval superiority in the region, and the realization of the measure provided Khrushchev with the necessary time to remove the constructed missile sites in Cuba (Carter, 2008). As a result, Khrushchev became responsible for the next step in the conflict.

The effective blockade or ‘quarantine’ provided the United States with the opportunity to avoid the uncontrolled confrontation between the states which could end with the nuclear war. Thus, President Kennedy informed the nation about the Soviet Union’s missile sites in Cuba and the intention to realize the blockade with the help of the national television on October 22.

The response of the Soviet Union to the actions of the United States was provided on October 23. The leaders of the state proclaimed that the actions of the USA were rather aggressive and threatening for the world peace (Gibson, 2012). The tension between the two powerful states increased significantly because the Soviet Union did not follow the US demands and the missiles were not removed.

The negotiations and discussions of the conflict could not result in the solution satisfactory for both the sides of the conflict. The speech of the US President provoked significant international reaction to the conflict where the Western countries were inclined to support the position of the United States, and they discussed Kennedy’s approach to resolving the crisis as rather reasonable.

The countries from the left camp considered the activities of the United States as too aggressive and provocative in relation to the risk of the nuclear war. On October 27, the message by Khrushchev was broadcasted to demonstrate the response of the Soviet Union to the proposed concessions.

It was stated in the message that the Soviet Union would remove the missiles from the territory of Cuba only after the removal of the US missiles from Turkey (Stein, 2008). The United States continued to support their vision of the conflict and rejected the conditions proposed in the message by Khrushchev. Furthermore, the Soviet Union’s missiles shot down the US plane, and the crisis was deepened.

The risk of the war became obvious. The United States focused on the peaceful resolution of the conflict and accepted Khrushchev’s demands to remove the missiles from the territories of Turkey. The leaders of the state expected the removal of the Soviet Union’s missiles from Cuba in response to the US actions as it was stated earlier in Khrushchev’s message (Gibson, 2012).

As a result, the rejection of the proposed conditions by Khrushchev could lead to his complete responsibility for the further development of military actions. On October 28, the crisis was resolved when Khrushchev agreed with the prepositions and actions of the United States. Thus, the resolution of the conflict was the result of the effective diplomatic strategies used by Kennedy and the United States’ administration in order to regulate the problem.

The Cuban-based missiles were dismantled as well as the US missiles were dismantled and removed from the territories of Turkey (Carter, 2008). The thirteen days of the crisis ended with starting a new page in the international relations between the two powerful states of the United States and the Soviet Union.

Focusing on the effects of the Cuban missile crisis, it is possible to state that the blockade realized by the United States and the associated demands were the only relevant method to resolve the conflict successfully for both the sides and avoid the development of the nuclear war. However, the nuclear war cannot be discussed as the goal of the Soviet Union determined before placing the missiles in Cuba or as the end goal of the United States to resolve the conflict in the region.

The prestige and role of Kennedy at the global political arena increased because of the obvious success of his diplomatic strategies used to resolve the Cuban crisis. Khrushchev also benefited from the peaceful resolution of the conflict when the United States confirmed the decision not to invade Cuba in the future.

The negative consequences of the crisis were connected with the status of Khrushchev in the Kremlin because of his impossibility to resolve the conflict to his advantage. Thus, Khrushchev’s intentions and motivation in relation to placing the missiles in Cuba remain to be the topic for many discussions (Stein, 2008). It is possible to state that the location of the missiles at the territories of Cuba was the part of the developed strategy used by the Soviet Union in order to succeed in the Cold War.

The effective resolution of the crisis led to the improvement of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union with references to improving the channels for the direct communication between the presidents. Thus, the Moscow-Washington hotline was worked out in order to prevent the similar conflicts in the future. Later, in 1963, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the agreement forbidding the exploration of the nuclear weapons.

Thus, the Cuban crisis can be discussed as the first influential step toward discussing the development of nuclear weapons as the illegal activities, which can result in the millions of victims and enormous devastation. The strategic model to regulate the crisis which was realized by Kennedy and the US administration during the process of the conflict resolution is discussed by researchers as the classical model utilized today as the example of the successful diplomatic approach to resolving crises (Gibson, 2011).

It was important for Kennedy to develop such a plan and conditions which could satisfy the opposite side and which could be successfully accepted by the both sides. It is possible to state that the effects of the Cuban crisis are in definite changes in the United States and Soviet Union’s policies. Thus, both the states realized the significant dependence on each other, which was emphasized with references to the threat of the nuclear war.

The relations between these two world powerful states achieved the new stage, and attempts of collaboration were realized in order to avoid the development of such conflict situations in the future (George, 2003). If the causes of the crisis cannot be stated clearly because of impossibility to conclude about Khrushchev’s intentions, the positive effects of the crisis are obvious.

The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 is the result of the prolonged confrontation between the two world powerful states such as the United States and the Soviet Union. The situation of the intensified tensions between the states’ leaders and developed Cold War provoked the placement of the Soviet Union’s missiles at the territories of Cuba as the reaction to the US invasion of Cuba and aggression.

Non-resolved conflicts between the two states stimulated the development of new problems and conflicts, and Cuban crisis became such an influential conflict which made the public speak about the threat of not only the third world war but also about the possibilities of the nuclear war. On the one hand, the Soviet Union focused on protecting the interests of the Cuban revolution and preventing the further attempts of the US forces to invade Cuba.

On the other hand, the United States responded to the risk of being attacked by the Soviet Union’s missiles because of the intensified conflicts. From this point, the causes for the development of the crisis were closely associated with the years of the Cold War and confrontation between the two states.

The blockade of the Soviet Union’s transport with the materials for constructing the missiles sites in Cuba along with the demand to remove the built missiles sites was discussed by the United States as the most effective measure to resolve the conflict following the interests of the both sides. That is why the realized diplomatic measures can be considered as the first step to resolving the prolonged Cold War and to avoiding the further crises.

Carter, E. (2008). The Cuban missile crisis . USA: Paw Prints.

George, A. (2003). Awaiting Armageddon: How Americans faced the Cuban missile crisis . Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Gibson, D. (2011). Speaking of the future: Contentious narration during the Cuban missile crisis. Qualitative Sociology, 34 (2), 503–522.

Gibson, D. (2012). Talk at the brink: Deliberation and decision during the Cuban missile crisis . Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Pressman, J. (2001). September statements, October missiles, November elections: Domestic politics, foreign-policy making, and the Cuban missile crisis. Security Studies, 10 (3), 80–114.

Schier, H. (2010). Cuban missile crisis . USA: ABDO.

Stein, C. (2008). Cuban missile crisis: In the shadow of nuclear war . USA: Enslow Publishers, Inc.

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The 5 Main Causes of the Cuban Missile Crisis

Harry Sherrin

14 oct 2021.

In 1962, Cold War tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union reached a fever pitch, placing the world on the brink of nuclear war.

The Soviets had started shipping nuclear weapons to Cuba, an island just 90 miles off the coast of Florida. In response, John F. Kennedy launched a naval blockade around the island. Stalemate.

For 13 days, the planet watched with bated breath, fearful of escalation. It was, many agree, the closest the world has come to all-out nuclear war.

But how did the Cold War become so heated? What led the two nations to such hostilities, and how did Cuba get involved? Here’s an explainer on the 5 key causes of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

1. The Cuban Revolution

In 1959, Cuban revolutionaries led by Fidel Castro and Che Guevera overthrew the regime of dictator Fulgencio Batista. The guerrilla rebels established Cuba as the first communist state in the Western Hemisphere and seized any US-owned businesses for the state.

The United States, then diametrically and vocally opposed to communism, found itself with a communist neighbour just 90 miles from Florida’s southern tip.

2. The Bay of Pigs Disaster

2 years after the Cuban Revolution, in April 1961, the United States launched a failed invasion of Cuba. Relations had worsened between the two nations after the revolution, with US sugar and oil companies falling under Cuban control.

John F. Kennedy’s government had the CIA arm and train a band of anti-Castro Cuban exiles. The US-backed force landed in the Bay of Pigs in southwest Cuba on 17 April 1961.

Castro’s Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces swiftly crushed the assault. But fearful of another US-led attack, Castro turned to the Soviet Union for support. At the height of the Cold War, the Soviets were more than willing to oblige.

3. The arms race

The Cold War was characterised by the rapid development of nuclear-armed weapons , especially by the US and the USSR. This so-called ‘arms race’ saw both nations, and their respective allies, produce countless atomic bombs and warheads.

A CIA photograph of a Soviet medium-range ballistic missile in Red Square, Moscow. 1965

Image Credit: Central Intelligence Agency / Public Domain

The US held some of their nuclear weapons in Turkey and Italy, easily within reach of Soviet soil. With American weapons trained on the USSR, Soviet leader Nikita Krushchev began shipping missiles to the Soviet Union’s new ally: Cuba.

4. The discovery of Soviet missiles on Cuba

On 14 October 1962, a U-2 stealth plane from the United States made a pass over Cuba and photographed the production of a Soviet missile. The photo reached President Kennedy on 16 October 1962. It revealed that almost every key US city, bar Seattle, was within range of the warheads.

The Cold War was heating up: Cuba’s Soviet missile sites put America under threat.

5. America’s naval blockade

After learning of the Soviet missiles on Cuba, President Kennedy decided not to invade the island or bomb the missile sites. Instead, he enacted a naval blockade around the country, shutting off any Soviet weaponry shipments and isolating the island.

At this point, the crisis reached its peak. The ensuing stalemate was viewed by many as the closest the world has come to nuclear war.

Thankfully, Kennedy and Krushchev resolved the conflict. The Soviets removed their missiles from Cuba and the US agreed to never invade Cuba. Kennedy also secretly removed America’s warheads from Turkey.

President John F. Kennedy signing the Cuba Quarantine Proclamation, 23 October 1962.

Image Credit: U.S. National Archives and Records Administration / Public Domain

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Cuban Missile Crisis

By: History.com Editors

Updated: April 20, 2023 | Original: January 4, 2010

During the Cuban Missile Crisis, leaders of the U.S. and the Soviet Union engaged in a tense, 13-day political and military standoff in October 1962 over the installation of nuclear-armed Soviet missiles on Cuba, just 90 miles from U.S. shores. In a TV address on October 22, 1962, President John F. Kennedy (1917-63) notified Americans about the presence of the missiles, explained his decision to enact a naval blockade around Cuba and made it clear the U.S. was prepared to use military force if necessary to neutralize this perceived threat to national security. Following this news, many people feared the world was on the brink of nuclear war. However, disaster was avoided when the U.S. agreed to Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev’s (1894-1971) offer to remove the Cuban missiles in exchange for the U.S. promising not to invade Cuba. Kennedy also secretly agreed to remove U.S. missiles from Turkey.

Discovering the Missiles

After seizing power in the Caribbean island nation of Cuba in 1959, leftist revolutionary leader Fidel Castro (1926-2016) aligned himself with the Soviet Union . Under Castro, Cuba grew dependent on the Soviets for military and economic aid. During this time, the U.S. and the Soviets (and their respective allies) were engaged in the Cold War (1945-91), an ongoing series of largely political and economic clashes.

Did you know? The actor Kevin Costner (1955-) starred in a movie about the Cuban Missile Crisis titled Thirteen Days . Released in 2000, the movie's tagline was "You'll never believe how close we came."

The two superpowers plunged into one of their biggest Cold War confrontations after the pilot of an American U-2 spy plane piloted by Major Richard Heyser making a high-altitude pass over Cuba on October 14, 1962, photographed a Soviet SS-4 medium-range ballistic missile being assembled for installation.

President Kennedy was briefed about the situation on October 16, and he immediately called together a group of advisors and officials known as the executive committee, or ExComm. For nearly the next two weeks, the president and his team wrestled with a diplomatic crisis of epic proportions, as did their counterparts in the Soviet Union.

A New Threat to the U.S.

For the American officials, the urgency of the situation stemmed from the fact that the nuclear-armed Cuban missiles were being installed so close to the U.S. mainland–just 90 miles south of Florida . From that launch point, they were capable of quickly reaching targets in the eastern U.S. If allowed to become operational, the missiles would fundamentally alter the complexion of the nuclear rivalry between the U.S. and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), which up to that point had been dominated by the Americans.

Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev had gambled on sending the missiles to Cuba with the specific goal of increasing his nation’s nuclear strike capability. The Soviets had long felt uneasy about the number of nuclear weapons that were targeted at them from sites in Western Europe and Turkey, and they saw the deployment of missiles in Cuba as a way to level the playing field. Another key factor in the Soviet missile scheme was the hostile relationship between the U.S. and Cuba. The Kennedy administration had already launched one attack on the island–the failed Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961–and Castro and Khrushchev saw the missiles as a means of deterring further U.S. aggression.

Watch the three-episode documentary event, Kennedy . Available to stream now.

Kennedy Weighs the Options

From the outset of the crisis, Kennedy and ExComm determined that the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba was unacceptable. The challenge facing them was to orchestrate their removal without initiating a wider conflict–and possibly a nuclear war. In deliberations that stretched on for nearly a week, they came up with a variety of options, including a bombing attack on the missile sites and a full-scale invasion of Cuba. But Kennedy ultimately decided on a more measured approach. First, he would employ the U.S. Navy to establish a blockade, or quarantine, of the island to prevent the Soviets from delivering additional missiles and military equipment. Second, he would deliver an ultimatum that the existing missiles be removed.

In a television broadcast on October 22, 1962, the president notified Americans about the presence of the missiles, explained his decision to enact the blockade and made it clear that the U.S. was prepared to use military force if necessary to neutralize this perceived threat to national security. Following this public declaration, people around the globe nervously waited for the Soviet response. Some Americans, fearing their country was on the brink of nuclear war, hoarded food and gas.

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Showdown at Sea: U.S. Blockades Cuba

A crucial moment in the unfolding crisis arrived on October 24, when Soviet ships bound for Cuba neared the line of U.S. vessels enforcing the blockade. An attempt by the Soviets to breach the blockade would likely have sparked a military confrontation that could have quickly escalated to a nuclear exchange. But the Soviet ships stopped short of the blockade.

Although the events at sea offered a positive sign that war could be averted, they did nothing to address the problem of the missiles already in Cuba. The tense standoff between the superpowers continued through the week, and on October 27, an American reconnaissance plane was shot down over Cuba, and a U.S. invasion force was readied in Florida. (The 35-year-old pilot of the downed plane, Major Rudolf Anderson, is considered the sole U.S. combat casualty of the Cuban missile crisis.) “I thought it was the last Saturday I would ever see,” recalled U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara (1916-2009), as quoted by Martin Walker in “The Cold War.” A similar sense of doom was felt by other key players on both sides.

Key Moments in the Cuban Missile Crisis

These are the steps that brought the United States and Soviet Union to the brink of nuclear war in 1962.

A Timeline of US‑Cuba Relations

Before Fidel Castro and the Cold War chill, America and Cuba shared close economic and political ties.

JFK Was Completely Unprepared For His Summit with Khrushchev

'He just beat the hell out of me,' Kennedy said.

A Deal Ends the Standoff

Despite the enormous tension, Soviet and American leaders found a way out of the impasse. During the crisis, the Americans and Soviets had exchanged letters and other communications, and on October 26, Khrushchev sent a message to Kennedy in which he offered to remove the Cuban missiles in exchange for a promise by U.S. leaders not to invade Cuba. The following day, the Soviet leader sent a letter proposing that the USSR would dismantle its missiles in Cuba if the Americans removed their missile installations in Turkey.

Officially, the Kennedy administration decided to accept the terms of the first message and ignore the second Khrushchev letter entirely. Privately, however, American officials also agreed to withdraw their nation’s missiles from Turkey. U.S. Attorney General Robert Kennedy (1925-68) personally delivered the message to the Soviet ambassador in Washington , and on October 28, the crisis drew to a close.

Both the Americans and Soviets were sobered by the Cuban Missile Crisis. The following year, a direct “hot line” communication link was installed between Washington and Moscow to help defuse similar situations, and the superpowers signed two treaties related to nuclear weapons. The Cold War was and the nuclear arms race was far from over, though. In fact, another legacy of the crisis was that it convinced the Soviets to increase their investment in an arsenal of intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of reaching the U.S. from Soviet territory.

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The Cold War

The cuban missile crisis.

On October 14th 1962, an American U-2 spy plane completed a relatively routine run over the island of Cuba, taking reconnaissance photographs (see picture) from an altitude of 12 miles. When the film was developed it revealed evidence of missiles being assembled and erected on Cuban soil. CIA and military analysts identified them as Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles, capable of carrying nuclear warheads. The presence of these weapons in neighbouring Cuba meant the Soviets could launch attacks on locations in the southern and eastern United States. This would give the Soviet Union a first-strike capacity, giving cities like Washington DC, New York and Philadelphia just a few minutes’ warning. President John F. Kennedy was briefed about the missiles four days later (October 18th). By the end of the day, Kennedy had formed an ‘executive committee’ (EXCOMM), a 13-man team to monitor and assess the situation and formulate response options. EXCOMM’s members included vice-president Lyndon Johnson, Kennedy’s brother Robert, defence secretary Robert McNamara and other advisors from the military and Department of State.

Over the next few days, Kennedy and EXCOMM weighed their options. They agreed that the US could not tolerate the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba. Diplomatic pressure on the Soviets to withdraw the missiles was also ruled out. Advice from EXCOMM suggested the Soviets would respond poorly to belligerent language or actions. An offer of exchange, such as the withdrawal or dismantling of US missile bases in Europe, might make the Kennedy administration appear weak, handing the Russians a propaganda victory. Kennedy’s military hierarchs recommended an airstrike to destroy the missiles, followed by a ground invasion of Cuba to eliminate Fidel Castro and his regime. But Kennedy – now more wary of military advice since the failed Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba – wanted to avoid a military confrontation with the Soviet Union. Instead, he authorised a naval blockade of the island. The US would draw a firm line around Cuba while seeking to avoid hostile action that risked triggering a nuclear war.

On October 22nd, Kennedy addressed the nation by television, announcing a “quarantine” of the Cuban island. He also said his administration would regard any missile attack launched from Cuba as an attack by the USSR, necessitating a full retaliatory response. Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev described Kennedy’s quarantine as a “pirate action” and informed Kennedy by telegram that Soviet ships would ignore it. Kennedy reminded Khrushchev that the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba breached an earlier promise by the Soviet government. US Navy warships initiated their quarantine of Cuba. They allowed some small freighters through but stopped larger vessels for inspection, finding no military equipment. Meanwhile, American U-2s continued their missions over Cuba, flying every two hours. These overflights reported no pause or slow-down in the assembly of Soviet missiles.

There was no change in the situation after four days of quarantine. Kennedy came under pressure from his generals, who urged an airstrike to destroy the missiles before they became operational. At this point, a military confrontation between the US and USSR seemed almost inevitable, generating fear about a possible nuclear exchange. All levels of government hastily organised civil defence measures such as public bomb shelters; in most cases, these were capable of sheltering barely one-third of the population. Some citizens constructed their own shelters and stockpiled tinned food and other necessities. Many gathered in prayer in their local churches. Others packed up their belongings and took extended vacations with family members in remote areas where nuclear missiles were less likely to fall. In Soviet Russia, press censorship meant that most citizens were largely unaware of the crisis unfolding in the Caribbean.

The stalemate was broken by a series of developments across two days. On October 25th Adlai Stevenson, the US ambassador to the United Nations, confronted the Soviet ambassador in the Security Council with photographic evidence of the Cuban missiles. Given their previous denials, this publicly exposed Soviet dishonesty during the crisis. Around this time the White House also received a backroom offer to resolve the crisis, passed to a Washington reporter by a Soviet agent. On October 26th, the US State Department received a long, rambling letter, purportedly from Khrushchev. This letter promised to withdraw the Cuban missiles, provided the US pledged to never attack or invade Cuba. A follow-up message proposed a more direct exchange: the removal of the Cuban missiles, in return for the removal of American Jupiter missiles from Turkey and Italy. Kennedy agreed to this, provided the deal was not made public. The arrangement was finalised on the evening of October 27th, though it almost fell through after an American U-2 was shot down over Cuba by a Soviet surface-to-air missile. Kennedy resisted considerable pressure from his generals to retaliate. It later emerged the Soviets in Cuba had fired on the U-2 without authorisation from Moscow.

“The die was cast when the president met with his Executive Committee in the Oval Room at 2.30pm. It was a long and, toward the end, an unexpectedly bitter session. The choices put toward Kennedy that afternoon were two: begin with the naval blockade and, if need be, move up the ladder of military responses, rung by rung; or begin with an air strike then move almost certainly to a full-scale invasion of Cuba… The president paused gravely before speaking his mind. He said that he preferred to start with limited action. An air attack, he felt, was the wrong way to start… Kennedy was still expecting a Soviet move against Berlin, whatever happened in Cuba.” Elie Abel, journalist

The Cuban missile crisis was arguably the ‘hottest’ point of the Cold War, the closest the world has come to nuclear destruction. As US Secretary of State Dean Rusk noted toward the end of the crisis, “We were eyeball to eyeball and the other guy just blinked”. Information revealed years later suggested that the crisis could easily have deteriorated into a nuclear exchange. Soviet officers in Cuba were equipped with about 100 tactical nuclear weapons – and the authority to use them if attacked. Castro, convinced that an American invasion was imminent, urged both Khrushchev and Soviet commanders in Cuba to launch a pre-emptive strike against the US. And during the naval quarantine, a US destroyer dropped depth charges on a Soviet submarine which, unbeknownst to the Americans, was armed with a 15 kiloton nuclear missile and authority to use it. Given that several Soviet officers were authorised to fire nuclear weapons of their own accord, Kennedy’s delicate handling of the situation seems judicious. In the wake of the crisis, the Soviets reorganised their command structure and nuclear launch protocols, while the White House and Kremlin installed a ‘hotline’ to ensure direct communication in the event of a similar emergency.

1. The Cuban missile crisis unfolded in October 1962, following the discovery by US spy planes of Soviet missile sites being installed on nearby Cuba.

2. Missiles in Cuba gave the Soviet Union a ‘first-strike’ capacity. Unwilling to tolerate this, President Kennedy formed a committee to orchestrate their removal.

3. Considering all options from diplomatic pressure to an airstrike or invasion, EXCOMM settled on a naval “quarantine” of all Soviet ships sailing to Cuba.

4. The Cuban crisis and the US blockade carried a significant risk of military confrontation between the US and USSR, with the consequent risk of nuclear war.

5. The crisis was eventually resolved through a secret deal, in which the Soviets withdrew the Cuban missiles in return for the withdrawal of American Jupiter missiles from Turkey and Italy.

A CIA appraisal of the political, economic and military situation in Cuba (August 1962) A CIA report on the Soviet-backed military build up in Cuba (September 1962) US intelligence report says the installation of Soviet missiles in Cuba is unlikely (September 1962) The first intelligence reports of Soviet ballistic missiles in Cuba (October 1962) An evaluation of the Soviet missile threat in Cuba, by US intelligence bodies (October 1962) Kennedy and his advisors discuss a response to the Cuban missiles (October 1962) President John F Kennedy announces a naval quarantine of Cuba (October 1962) Castro responds to Kennedy’s announcement of a blockade (October 1962) Adlai Stevenson confronts Soviet ambassador Zorin in the UN Security Council (October 1962) Khrushchev’s letter to Kennedy urging a resolution of the crisis (October 1962) Delegates from the US and USSR debate the Cuban missile crisis in the UN (October 1962) Kennedy’s alternative speech announcing an attack on Cuba (October 1962) The Missiles of October (1974 film) Thirteen Days (2000 film) Robert McNamara reflects on the Cuban missile crisis (2003)

Content on this page is © Alpha History 2018. This content may not be republished or distributed without permission. For more information please refer to our Terms of Use . This page was written by Jennifer Llewellyn, Jim Southey and Steve Thompson. To reference this page, use the following citation: J. Llewellyn et al, “The Cuban missile crisis”, Alpha History, accessed [today’s date], https://alphahistory.com/coldwar/cuban-missile-crisis/.

Essay: The Lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis

For 13 chilling days in October 1962, it seemed that John F. Kennedy and Nikita S. Khrushchev might be playing out the opening scenes of World War III. The Cuban missile crisis was a uniquely compact moment of history. For the first time in the nuclear age, the two superpowers found themselves in a sort of moral road test of their apocalyptic powers.

The crisis blew up suddenly. The U.S. discovered that the Soviet Union, despite repeated and solemn denials, was installing nuclear missiles in Cuba. An American U-2 spy plane came back with photographs of the bases and their support facilities under construction: clear, irrefutable evidence. Kennedy assembled a task force of advisers. Some of them wanted to invade Cuba. In the end, Kennedy chose a course of artful restraint; he laid down a naval quarantine. After six days, Khrushchev announced that the Soviet missiles would be dismantled.

The crisis served some purposes. The U.S. and the Soviet Union have had no comparable collision since then. On the other hand, the humiliation that Khrushchev suffered may have hastened his fall. The experience may be partly responsible for both the Soviet military buildup in the past two decades and whatever enthusiasm the Soviets have displayed for nuclear disarmament.

Now, on the 20th anniversary of the crisis, six of Kennedy’s men have collaborated on a remarkable joint statement on the lessons of that October. It contains some new information, particularly in Point Eight, and at least one of their conclusions is startling and controversial: their thought that, contrary to the widespread assumption of the past two decades, the American nuclear superiority over the Soviets in 1962 had no crucial influence with Washington or Moscow at the time—and that in general, nuclear superiority is insignificant.

The authors are Dean Rusk, then Secretary of State; Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense; George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State; Roswell L. Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary of Defense; Theodore Sorensen, special counsel to the President; and McGeorge Bundy, special assistant to the President for national security affairs. Their analysis:

In the years since the Cuban missile crisis, many commentators have examined the affair and offered a wide variety of conclusions. It seems fitting now that some of us who worked particularly closely with President Kennedy during that crisis should offer a few comments, with the advantages both of participation and of hindsight.

FIRST: The crisis could and should have been avoided. If we had done an earlier, stronger and clearer job of explaining our position on Soviet nuclear weapons in the Western Hemisphere, or if the Soviet government had more carefully assessed the evidence that did exist on this point, it is likely that the missiles would never have been sent to Cuba. The importance of accurate mutual assessment of interests between the two superpowers is evident and continuous.

SECOND: Reliable intelligence permitting an effective choice of response was obtained only just in time. It was primarily a mistake by policymakers, not by professionals, that made such intelligence unavailable sooner. But it was also a timely recognition of the need for thorough overflight, not without its hazards, that produced the decisive photographs. The usefulness and scope of inspection from above, also employed in monitoring the Soviet missile withdrawal, should never be underestimated. When the importance of accurate information for a crucial policy decision is high enough, risks not otherwise acceptable in collecting intelligence can become profoundly prudent.

THIRD: The President wisely took his time in choosing a course of action. A quick decision would certainly have been less carefully designed and could well have produced a much higher risk of catastrophe. The fact that the crisis did not become public in its first week obviously made it easier for President Kennedy to consider his options with a maximum of care and a minimum of outside pressure. Not every future crisis will be so quiet in its first phase, but Americans should always respect the need for a period of confidential and careful deliberation in dealing with a major international crisis.

FOURTH: The decisive military element in the resolution of the crisis was our clearly available and applicable superiority in conventional weapons within the area of the crisis. U.S. naval forces, quickly deployable for the blockade of offensive weapons that was sensibly termed a quarantine, and the availability of U.S. ground and air forces sufficient to execute an invasion if necessary, made the difference. American nuclear superiority was not in our view a critical factor, for the fundamental and controlling reason that nuclear war, already in 1962, would have been an unexampled catastrophe for both sides; the balance of terror so eloquently described by Winston Churchill seven years earlier was in full operation. No one of us ever reviewed the nuclear balance for comfort in those hard weeks. The Cuban missile crisis illustrates not the significance but the insignificance of nuclear superiority in the face of survivable thermonuclear retaliatory forces. It also shows the crucial role of rapidly available conventional strength.

FIFTH: The political and military pressure created by the quarantine was matched by a diplomatic effort that ignored no relevant means of communication with both our friends and our adversary. Communication to and from our allies in Europe was intense, and their support sturdy. The Organization of American States gave the moral and legal authority of its regional backing to the quarantine, making it plain that Soviet nuclear weapons were profoundly unwelcome in the Americas. In the U.N., Ambassador Adlai Stevenson drove home with angry eloquence and unanswerable photographic evidence the facts of the Soviet deployment and deception.

Still more important, communication was established and maintained, once our basic course was set, with the government of the Soviet Union. If the crisis itself showed the cost of mutual incomprehension, its resolution showed the value of serious and sustained communication, and in particular of direct exchanges between the two heads of government.

When great states come anywhere near the brink in the nuclear age, there is no room for games of blindman’s buff. Nor can friends be led by silence. They must know what we are doing and why. Effective communication is never more important than when there is a military confrontation.

SIXTH: This diplomatic effort and indeed our whole course of action were greatly reinforced by the fact that our position was squarely based on irrefutable evidence that the Soviet government was doing exactly what it had repeatedly denied that it would do. The support of our allies and the readiness of the Soviet government to draw back were heavily affected by the public demonstration of a Soviet course of conduct that simply could not be defended. In this demonstration no evidence less explicit and authoritative than that of photography would have been sufficient, and it was one of President Kennedy’s best decisions that the ordinary requirements of secrecy in such matters should be brushed aside in the interest of persuasive exposition. There are times when a display of hard evidence is more valuable than protection of intelligence techniques.

SEVENTH: In the successful resolution of the crisis, restraint was as important as strength. In particular, we avoided any early initiation of battle by American forces, and indeed we took no action of any kind that would have forced an instant and possibly ill-considered response. Moreover, we limited our demands to the restoration of the status quo ante, that is, the removal of any Soviet nuclear capability from Cuba. There was no demand for “total victory” or “unconditional surrender.” These choices gave the Soviet government both time and opportunity to respond with equal restraint. It is wrong, in relations between the superpowers, for either side to leave the other with no way out but war or humiliation.

EIGHTH: On two points of particular interest to the Soviet government, we made sure that it had the benefit of knowing the independently reached positions of President Kennedy. One assurance was public and the other private.

Publicly we made it clear that the U.S. would not invade Cuba if the Soviet missiles were withdrawn. The President never shared the view that the missile crisis should be “used” to pick a fight to the finish with Castro; he correctly insisted that the real issue in the crisis was with the Soviet government, and that the one vital bone of contention was the secret and deceit-covered movement of Soviet missiles into Cuba. He recognized that an invasion by U.S. forces would be bitter and bloody, and that it would leave festering wounds in the body politic of the Western Hemisphere. The no-invasion assurance was not a concession, but a statement of our own clear preference—once the missiles were withdrawn.

The second and private assurance—communicated on the President’s instructions by Robert Kennedy to Soviet Ambassador Anatoli Dobrynin on the evening of Oct. 27—was that the President had determined that once the crisis was resolved, the American missiles then in Turkey would be removed. (The essence of this secret assurance was revealed by Robert Kennedy in his 1969 book Thirteen Days, and a more detailed account, drawn from many sources but not from discussion with any of us, was published by Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. in Robert Kennedy and His Times in 1978. In these circumstances, we think it is now proper for those of us privy to that decision to discuss the matter.) This could not be a “deal”—our missiles in Turkey for theirs in Cuba—as the Soviet government had just proposed. The matter involved the concerns of our allies, and we could not put ourselves in the position of appearing to trade their protection for our own. But in fact President Kennedy had long since reached the conclusion that the outmoded and vulnerable missiles in Turkey should be withdrawn. In the spring of 1961 Secretary Rusk had begun the necessary discussions with high Turkish officials. These officials asked for delay, at least until Polaris submarines could be deployed in the Mediterranean. While the matter was not pressed to a conclusion in the following year and a half, the missile crisis itself reinforced the President’s convictions. It was entirely right that the Soviet government should understand this reality.

This second assurance was kept secret because the few who knew about it at the time were in unanimous agreement that any other course would have had explosive and destructive effects on the security of the U.S. and its allies. If made public in the context of the Soviet proposal to make a “deal,” the unilateral decision reached by the President would have been misread as an unwilling concession granted in fear at the expense of an ally. It seemed better to tell the Soviets the real position in private, and in a way that would prevent any such misunderstanding. Robert Kennedy made it plain to Ambassador Dobrynin that any attempt to treat the President’s unilateral assurance as part of a deal would simply make that assurance inoperative.

Although for separate reasons neither the public nor the private assurance ever became a formal commitment of the U.S. Government, the validity of both was demonstrated by our later actions; there was no invasion of Cuba, and the vulnerable missiles in Turkey (and Italy) were withdrawn, with allied concurrence, to be replaced by invulnerable Polaris submarines. Both results were in our own clear interest, and both assurances were helpful in making it easier for the Soviet government to decide to withdraw its missiles.

In part this was secret diplomacy, including a secret assurance. Any failure to make good on that assurance would obviously have had damaging effects on Soviet-American relations. But it is of critical importance here that the President gave no assurance that went beyond his own presidential powers; in particular he made no commitment that required congressional approval or even support. The decision that the missiles in Turkey should be removed was one that the President had full and unquestioned authority to make and execute.

When it will help your own country for your adversary to know your settled intentions, you should find effective ways of making sure that he does, and a secret assurance is justified when a) you can keep your word, and b) no other course can avoid grave damage to your country’s legitimate interests.

NINTH: The gravest risk in this crisis was not that either head of government desired to initiate a major escalation but that events would produce actions, reactions or miscalculations carrying the conflict beyond the control of one or the other or both. In retrospect we are inclined to think that both men would have taken every possible step to prevent such a result, but at the time no one near the top of either government could have that certainty about the other side. In any crisis involving the superpowers, firm control by the heads of both governments is essential to the avoidance of an unpredictably escalating conflict.

TENTH: The successful resolution of the Cuban missile crisis was fundamentally the achievement of two men, John F. Kennedy and Nikita S. Khrushchev. We know that in this anniversary year John Kennedy would wish us to emphasize the contribution of Khrushchev; the fact that an earlier and less prudent decision by the Soviet leader made the crisis inevitable does not detract from the statesmanship of his change of course. We may be forgiven, however, if we give the last and highest word of honor to our own President, whose cautious determination, steady composure, deep-seated compassion and, above all, continuously attentive control of our options and actions brilliantly served his country and all mankind. –

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Milestones: 1961–1968

The cuban missile crisis, october 1962.

The Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 was a direct and dangerous confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War and was the moment when the two superpowers came closest to nuclear conflict. The crisis was unique in a number of ways, featuring calculations and miscalculations as well as direct and secret communications and miscommunications between the two sides. The dramatic crisis was also characterized by the fact that it was primarily played out at the White House and the Kremlin level with relatively little input from the respective bureaucracies typically involved in the foreign policy process.

After the failed U.S. attempt to overthrow the Castro regime in Cuba with the Bay of Pigs invasion, and while the Kennedy administration planned Operation Mongoose, in July 1962 Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev reached a secret agreement with Cuban premier Fidel Castro to place Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba to deter any future invasion attempt. Construction of several missile sites began in the late summer, but U.S. intelligence discovered evidence of a general Soviet arms build-up on Cuba, including Soviet IL–28 bombers, during routine surveillance flights, and on September 4, 1962, President Kennedy issued a public warning against the introduction of offensive weapons into Cuba. Despite the warning, on October 14 a U.S. U–2 aircraft took several pictures clearly showing sites for medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic nuclear missiles (MRBMs and IRBMs) under construction in Cuba. These images were processed and presented to the White House the next day, thus precipitating the onset of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Kennedy summoned his closest advisers to consider options and direct a course of action for the United States that would resolve the crisis. Some advisers—including all the Joint Chiefs of Staff—argued for an air strike to destroy the missiles, followed by a U.S. invasion of Cuba; others favored stern warnings to Cuba and the Soviet Union. The President decided upon a middle course. On October 22, he ordered a naval “quarantine” of Cuba. The use of “quarantine” legally distinguished this action from a blockade, which assumed a state of war existed; the use of “quarantine” instead of “blockade” also enabled the United States to receive the support of the Organization of American States.

That same day, Kennedy sent a letter to Khrushchev declaring that the United States would not permit offensive weapons to be delivered to Cuba, and demanded that the Soviets dismantle the missile bases already under construction or completed, and return all offensive weapons to the U.S.S.R. The letter was the first in a series of direct and indirect communications between the White House and the Kremlin throughout the remainder of the crisis.

The President also went on national television that evening to inform the public of the developments in Cuba, his decision to initiate and enforce a “quarantine,” and the potential global consequences if the crisis continued to escalate. The tone of the President’s remarks was stern, and the message unmistakable and evocative of the Monroe Doctrine: “It shall be the policy of this nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff announced a military readiness status of DEFCON 3 as U.S. naval forces began implementation of the quarantine and plans accelerated for a military strike on Cuba.

On October 24, Khrushchev responded to Kennedy’s message with a statement that the U.S. “blockade” was an “act of aggression” and that Soviet ships bound for Cuba would be ordered to proceed. Nevertheless, during October 24 and 25, some ships turned back from the quarantine line; others were stopped by U.S. naval forces, but they contained no offensive weapons and so were allowed to proceed. Meanwhile, U.S. reconnaissance flights over Cuba indicated the Soviet missile sites were nearing operational readiness. With no apparent end to the crisis in sight, U.S. forces were placed at DEFCON 2—meaning war involving the Strategic Air Command was imminent. On October 26, Kennedy told his advisors it appeared that only a U.S. attack on Cuba would remove the missiles, but he insisted on giving the diplomatic channel a little more time. The crisis had reached a virtual stalemate.

That afternoon, however, the crisis took a dramatic turn. ABC News correspondent John Scali reported to the White House that he had been approached by a Soviet agent suggesting that an agreement could be reached in which the Soviets would remove their missiles from Cuba if the United States promised not to invade the island. While White House staff scrambled to assess the validity of this “back channel” offer, Khrushchev sent Kennedy a message the evening of October 26, which meant it was sent in the middle of the night Moscow time. It was a long, emotional message that raised the specter of nuclear holocaust, and presented a proposed resolution that remarkably resembled what Scali reported earlier that day. “If there is no intention,” he said, “to doom the world to the catastrophe of thermonuclear war, then let us not only relax the forces pulling on the ends of the rope, let us take measures to untie that knot. We are ready for this.”

Although U.S. experts were convinced the message from Khrushchev was authentic, hope for a resolution was short-lived. The next day, October 27, Khrushchev sent another message indicating that any proposed deal must include the removal of U.S. Jupiter missiles from Turkey. That same day a U.S. U–2 reconnaissance jet was shot down over Cuba. Kennedy and his advisors prepared for an attack on Cuba within days as they searched for any remaining diplomatic resolution. It was determined that Kennedy would ignore the second Khrushchev message and respond to the first one. That night, Kennedy set forth in his message to the Soviet leader proposed steps for the removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba under supervision of the United Nations, and a guarantee that the United States would not attack Cuba.

It was a risky move to ignore the second Khrushchev message. Attorney General Robert Kennedy then met secretly with Soviet Ambassador to the United States, Anatoly Dobrynin, and indicated that the United States was planning to remove the Jupiter missiles from Turkey anyway, and that it would do so soon, but this could not be part of any public resolution of the missile crisis. The next morning, October 28, Khrushchev issued a public statement that Soviet missiles would be dismantled and removed from Cuba.

The crisis was over but the naval quarantine continued until the Soviets agreed to remove their IL–28 bombers from Cuba and, on November 20, 1962, the United States ended its quarantine. U.S. Jupiter missiles were removed from Turkey in April 1963.

The Cuban missile crisis stands as a singular event during the Cold War and strengthened Kennedy’s image domestically and internationally. It also may have helped mitigate negative world opinion regarding the failed Bay of Pigs invasion. Two other important results of the crisis came in unique forms. First, despite the flurry of direct and indirect communications between the White House and the Kremlin—perhaps because of it—Kennedy and Khrushchev, and their advisers, struggled throughout the crisis to clearly understand each others’ true intentions, while the world hung on the brink of possible nuclear war. In an effort to prevent this from happening again, a direct telephone link between the White House and the Kremlin was established; it became known as the “Hotline.” Second, having approached the brink of nuclear conflict, both superpowers began to reconsider the nuclear arms race and took the first steps in agreeing to a nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

National Archives News

Cuban Missile Crisis

At the height of the Cold War, for two weeks in October 1962, the world teetered on the edge of thermonuclear war. Earlier that fall, the Soviet Union, under orders from Premier Nikita Khrushchev, began to secretly deploy a nuclear strike force in Cuba, just 90 miles from the United States. President John F. Kennedy said the missiles would not be tolerated and insisted on their removal. Khrushchev refused. The standoff nearly caused a nuclear exchange and is remembered in this country as the Cuban Missile Crisis. For 13 agonizing days—from October 16 through October 28—the United States and the Soviet Union stood on the brink of nuclear war. The peaceful resolution of the crisis with the Soviets is considered to be one of Kennedy’s greatest achievements.

Research Resources

• Military Resources: Bay of Pigs Invasion & Cuban Missile Crisis
• John F. Kennedy Library Research Subject Guide: Cuban Missile Crisis
• Cuban Missile Crisis Chronology
• Department of Defense Cuban Missile Crisis Briefing Materials
• CIA-prepared personality studies of Nikita Khrushchev and Fidel Castro
• Satellite images of missile sites under construction
• Secret correspondence between Kennedy and Khrushchev
• National Archives Catalog Subject Finding Aid for Cuban Missile Crisis (Still Picture Branch)
• JFK’s doodles from October 1962
• Aerial Photograph of Missiles in Cuba (1962) , Milestone Documents

President John F. Kennedy signs the Cuba Quarantine Order, October 23, 1962. ( Kennedy Library )

Audio and Video

• President Kennedy’s radio and television address to the American people on the Soviet arms build-up in Cuba, October 22, 1962 
• President Kennedy’s radio and television remarks on the dismantling of Soviet missile bases in Cuba, November 2, 1962
• Telephone conversation between President Kennedy and former President Eisenhower, October 28, 1962
• Telephone recordings, Cuban Missile Crisis Update, October 22, 1962
• Atomic Gambit: JFK Library podcast for 60th anniversary
• Poise, Professionalism and a Little Luck, the Cuban Missile Crisis 1962 (panel discussion)
• Nuclear Folly: A History of the Cuban Missile Crisis (author lecture)

Kennedy Library Forums

• Cuban Missile Crisis: An Historical Perspective (October 6, 2002)
• On the Brink: The Cuban Missile Crisis (October 20, 2002)
• The Cuban Missile Crisis: An Eyewitness Perspective (October 17, 2007)
• Presidency in the Nuclear Age: Cuban Missile Crisis and the First Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (October 12, 2009)
• 50th Anniversary of the Cuban Missile Crisis (October 14, 2012)

The Cuban Missile Crisis: Lessons for Today (October 22,2022)

Articles and Blog Posts

• One Step from Nuclear War—The Cuban Missile Crisis at 50  (Prologue)
• Forty Years Ago: The Cuban Missile Crisis  (Prologue)
• Cuban Missile Crisis, Revisited (Text Message blog)

60th Anniversary: The Cuban Missile Crisis (Unwritten Record)

Education Resources

• The Cuban Missile Crisis: How to Respond?  (high school curriculum resource)
• World on the Brink: JFK and the Cuban Missile Crisis (online exhibit)

Find answers to your questions on History Hub

Cuban Missile Crisis

For thirteen days in october 1962 the world waited—seemingly on the brink of nuclear war—and hoped for a peaceful resolution to the cuban missile crisis..

In October 1962, an American U-2 spy plane secretly photographed nuclear missile sites being built by the Soviet Union on the island of Cuba. President Kennedy did not want the Soviet Union and Cuba to know that he had discovered the missiles. He met in secret with his advisors for several days to discuss the problem.

After many long and difficult meetings, Kennedy decided to place a naval blockade, or a ring of ships, around Cuba. The aim of this "quarantine," as he called it, was to prevent the Soviets from bringing in more military supplies. He demanded the removal of the missiles already there and the destruction of the sites. On October 22, President Kennedy spoke to the nation about the crisis in a televised address.

Click here to listen to the Address in the Digital Archives  (JFKWHA-142-001)

No one was sure how Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev would respond to the naval blockade and US demands. But the leaders of both superpowers recognized the devastating possibility of a nuclear war and publicly agreed to a deal in which the Soviets would dismantle the weapon sites in exchange for a pledge from the United States not to invade Cuba. In a separate deal, which remained secret for more than twenty-five years, the United States also agreed to remove its nuclear missiles from Turkey. Although the Soviets removed their missiles from Cuba, they escalated the building of their military arsenal; the missile crisis was over, the arms race was not.

Click here to listen to the Remarks in the Digital Archives (JFKWHA-143-004)

In 1963, there were signs of a lessening of tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States. In his commencement address at American University, President Kennedy urged Americans to reexamine Cold War stereotypes and myths and called for a strategy of peace that would make the world safe for diversity. Two actions also signaled a warming in relations between the superpowers: the establishment of a teletype "Hotline" between the Kremlin and the White House and the signing of the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty on July 25, 1963.

In language very different from his inaugural address, President Kennedy told Americans in June 1963, "For, in the final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal."

Visit our online exhibit:  World on the Brink: John F. Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis

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Lesson Plan

The Cuban Missile Crisis and Its Relevance Today

Sixty years ago, the world teetered on the brink of nuclear war. Today, we face a new nuclear threat as events in Ukraine escalate. What are the lessons of the Cuban missile crisis for us now?

By Jeremy Engle

Lesson Overview

Sixty years ago this week, the United States and the Soviet Union narrowly averted catastrophe over the installation of nuclear-armed Soviet missiles on Cuba, just 90 miles from U.S. shores. During the standoff, President John F. Kennedy believed that the chances the crisis would escalate to war, he later confided , were “between 1 in 3 and even.”

How did the crisis begin? How did it end? And what lessons can it provide today, as another nuclear threat looms over the war in Ukraine?

In this lesson, students will learn how and why the United States and the Soviet Union came to the brink of nuclear war in 1962 by closely examining a curated selection of primary and secondary sources — photographs and original news reporting, letters and telegrams, newsreels and newspaper headlines — from the archives of The New York Times and beyond. Then, you will consider the lessons from that tense showdown and what they can provide today.

The front page of The New York Times on Oct. 23, 1962

The front page of The New York Times on Oct. 24, 1962

The front page of The New York Times on Oct. 25, 1962

The front page of The New York Times on Oct. 26, 1962

The front page of The New York Times on Oct. 27, 1962

The front page of The New York Times on Oct. 28, 1962

The front page of The New York Times on Oct. 29, 1962

What do you know about the Cuban missile crisis?

How did it begin? How did it end? Which nations and leaders were involved? And why are the events of 60 years ago still studied today by students and world leaders alike?

Look closely at the collection of headlines above from New York Times reporting on the crisis from 1962. Then, in writing or through discussion with a partner, respond to the following prompts:

What do you notice about the headlines — the language, style, tone and point of view?

What can you learn about the Cuban missile crisis from the collection? What story do these headlines tell?

How do you think you would have reacted to the Times headlines had you been alive at the time?

What questions do you have about Times headlines or the Cuban missile crisis in general?

Write a catchy headline to capture the story of the entire collection of Times front pages.

Explore Primary and Secondary Sources From The Times and Beyond

Below we have curated a collection of primary and secondary sources from The Times and elsewhere, including photos, original news reporting, newsreels and historical analyses, for students to examine and investigate, to better understand what it was like to live through these events as well as what really happened during these tumultuous 13 days.

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Primary Sources: The 1960s: Cuban Missile Crisis (1962)

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Online Sources: Cuban Missile Crisis

• CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis more... less... a pdf of documents related to the crisis available from the CIA website
• The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 more... less... "Press releases, selected documents, photographs, audio clips and other material"
• Cuban Missile Crisis - NSA/CSS more... less... Documents related to the Cuban Missile Crisis available at the National Security Agency website.
• Cuban Missile Crisis: Avalon Project more... less... Documents related to the Crisis provided by Yale's Project Avalon.
• Cuban Missile Crisis: Belfer Center more... less... Provides access to various information about the crisis. Primary Source materials can be found under the About the Crisis section, "Original Historic Sources."
• Cuban Missile Crisis: Kennedy Library more... less... Materials in the Kennedy Library Digital Archives related to the Cuban Missile Crisis.
• Cuban Missile Crisis: Wilson Center Digital Archives more... less... "Documents concerning the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962--a major confrontation that brought the Soviet Union and the United States close to war over the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba. The documents are drawn from countries all around the world and discuss armament and military supplies sent to Cuba, troop training, security issues in the region, and relations with the US. There are many items of correspondence during the crisis itself, including letters between Soviet representatives in Cuba, the US, the UN, and the USSR Foreign Ministry."
• The Cuban Missile Crisis @ 60 : How John F. Kennedy Sacrificed His Most Consequential Crisis Advisor more... less... "Documents Chart Critical Contribution of U.N. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson in Missile Crisis Management and Resolution Stevenson’s Diplomatic Admonition: “Blackmail and Intimidation Never; Negotiation and Sanity Always”"
• Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath
• Papers of Robert F. Kennedy. Attorney General Papers more... less... Some of the Robert Kennedy's paper have been released online by the John F. Kennedy Library & Museum. Currently (10/2012) material covers the Cuban Missile Crisis.
• Report to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board on Intelligence, Community Activities Relating to the Cuban Arms Build-up

Click the tab for Kennedy

• Primary Sources: U.S. Presidents by Trible Library at CNU Last Updated Aug 14, 2024 19673 views this year

Book Sources: Cuban Missile Crisis

• A selection of books/e-books available in Trible Library.
• Click the title for location and availability information.

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I Blog to Differ

Critical thinking and the cuban missile crisis, they couldn't handle the truth..

I was talking to a friend last month about the sorry state of American government schools nowadays. He said he thought that schools should teach students how to think critically and make an argument. I agree, although that’s more easily said than done.

But he also said that they should “return” to doing that. Implicit in that statement is that they used to do that. I’m sure that there were teachers who did that. It’s even plausible that a higher percentage of teachers did that some decades ago. Especially when you take account of Common Core, which has narrowed the curriculum and made it hard for teachers to fit in critical thinking skills.

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That reminded me of such an incident. It relates to critical thinking. (I often have vivid memories of such incidents because of what I learned from them. I’ll tell them occasionally.)

In Grade 8, I was in Miss Bowes’s class . I liked school and so I sat at the front and was very active in the discussions. I got the impression early on, though, that Miss Bowes didn’t like me. I never figured out why. My best guess is that it was because I wasn’t my brother, Paul. She had had him in her class 2 years earlier and he was an incredible artist. She loved art and she liked Paul a lot. I think I was probably the worst artist in a class of about 30. I think she even said once that it was too bad that I didn’t have Paul’s skills.

One morning in October 1962, before classes started, Miss Bowes was sitting around talking to Mrs. Metcalfe, who had been my Grade 6 teacher. They were discussing the Cuban missile crisis, which I had been following in the daily Winnipeg Free Press . Mrs. Metcalfe stated that President Kennedy was stopping all ships from getting through his “quarantine” and docking in Cuba. I knew that was incorrect and I naively thought Mrs. Metcalfe would want to know the truth. So I told her that that wasn’t so, that Kennedy wanted the U.S. Navy to check each ship but if ships were bringing food or medical supplies, they would be allowed through. Mrs. Metcalfe didn't thank me and just went back to her conversation with Miss Bowes.

Oh, well, I thought, I didn’t get through. Disappointing, but not a big deal.

I was wrong. It was a big deal to Miss Bowes.

Later that morning, in some discussion of class material, I answered a question and got it slightly wrong. Miss Bowes suddenly got angry, told me I was wrong, and then said that just for that I should go down to Mrs. Metcalfe’s classroom and apologize for contradicting her earlier that morning. She insisted that I do it right away.

So I went down to Mrs. Metcalfe’s class and knocked on the door. Mrs. Metcalfe came to the door looking kind of puzzled. With tears in my eyes, I looked up at her and said, “I’m sorry for disagreeing with you.” She still looked puzzled and said something like “Ok,” and then closed the door.

I went back to Miss Bowes’s class.

By the way, what would I have done if I had not been such a rule follower? I would have gone to the bathroom, killed a minute or two, and then gone back to class. In those days, though, I thought there was enough surveillance and feedback between adults that I would get caught. I probably wouldn’t have.

I learned my lesson, though about contradicting people in positions of authority. Sometime in early 1963 there was a short item in the Free Press telling a lighter story about the crisis that, said the Free Press , could now be told. Apparently, a Soviet captain was delivering a ship full of onions to Cuba during the crisis. He radioed back to his superiors to ask them what to tell the Americans when he was stopped. How would he convince them that he was carrying onions? Came back the word: “Tell them to sniff.” It worked. The onions got through.

I clipped the item, thinking I would take it in and show it first to Miss Bowes and then to Mrs. Metcalfe. Then I actually did some critical thinking. I decided not to. The odds that they would welcome that information were very low.   

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